

# New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange

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A kidney transplant is the treatment of choice for end stage renal disease, but over 90,000 patients are waiting for a cadaver kidney in the U.S., and fewer than 11,000 such transplants are performed annually. Live donation is also possible, and there are now more live than deceased donors each year in the U.S., although they still account for fewer than 6,500 transplants a year (since living donors only donate one kidney). And having a healthy willing live donor is not enough: sometimes a donor's kidney is incompatible with the intended recipient, either because of blood type or immunological incompatibilities. Incompatibility between donor and intended recipient creates the demand for *kidney exchange* (aka *kidney paired donation*): an incompatible patient-donor pair can donate a kidney to a compatible recipient and receive a kidney from a compatible donor.

The first kidney exchange was in Korea (J.Y. Kwak et al. (1999)), where the high frequency of blood types A and B make exchanges due to blood type incompatibility readily available (an A-B pair exchanging with a B-A pair, where X-Y denotes a patient of blood type X and donor of blood type Y), more than in the U.S. where blood type B is relatively rare. The first kidney exchange in the U.S., in New England in 2000, also involved two blood type incompatible pairs (see Bradley C. Wallis et al. (2011) for history and references). And for most patients on the waiting list for cadaver kidneys, blood type determines compatibility with a given donor. Only 10% of those 90,000 patients are "highly sensitized," meaning they are *immunologically* incompatible with more than 80% of donors with compatible blood type.

But the patients enrolled in the most active kidney exchange networks are much more highly sensitized: in the four exchange networks

with which we have worked, the percentage of highly sensitized patients is from 50%-80% of those enrolled (Ashlagi, David Gamarnik and Roth (2011)). The present paper considers why this is the case, and its consequences.

While the first proposal for organizing kidney exchange on a large scale involved exchanges organized as both cycles and chains, logistical constraints required that the initial exchanges conducted by the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, the Alliance for Paired Donation and other networks were between just two patient-donor pairs (Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver (2004,2005a,b) ).<sup>1</sup> Subsequent work suggested that as patient pools grew larger, expanding the infrastructure to allow only slightly larger, 3- and 4-way exchanges would be efficient (Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2007a)). But the prevalence of highly sensitized patients among those enrolled in kidney exchange has brought long chains back into the picture in an important way, after the introduction of non-simultaneous chains initiated by a non-directed donor (Roth et al. (2006), Michael Rees et al. (2009)). Chains now contribute many of the kidney exchanges performed by all of the largest multi-hospital networks. The usefulness of chains turns out to be closely related to the highly sensitized patient population. And one of several causes of the high percentage of highly sensitized patients is that many large transplant centers are withholding their easy-to-match patient-donor pairs, and only enrolling their hard-to-match pairs. This reduces the total number of transplants that can be achieved, particularly for the most highly sensitized patients.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In addition to those two large kidney exchange clearing-houses, kidney exchange today is practiced by a growing number of hospitals and consortia. Computer scientists have become involved, and an algorithm of David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum and Tuomas Sandholm (2007) designed to handle large populations is used in the UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing) pilot program for a national exchange.

<sup>2</sup>For example, the UNOS kidney exchange program was begun in 2010 and through the end of 2011 it had accomplished only 17 transplants, from a small pool of enrolled patient-donor

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(Another reason the patient pool becomes highly sensitized is that sensitized patients remain unmatched longer, and build up in the patient pool, but the data show even the initially enrolled patients are highly sensitized.)

There are several reasons why hospitals wish to conduct their own exchanges for easy-to-match pairs, including *compatible pairs* in which the donor can donate to the intended patient.<sup>3</sup> These include the difficult logistics of coordinating with other hospitals, paying for the tests that establish donor-recipient compatibility before knowing who the recipient will be (Rees et al. (2012)), and, finally, the fact that presently used matching algorithms do not make it individually rational (IR) for hospitals to enroll all their pairs, since they do not guarantee each hospital that enrolling all its patients will allow it to perform as many transplants as it could get by enrolling only some patients and doing some exchanges internally among its own patients.

The initial papers on kidney exchange focused on incentives for patients and their surgeons, but the current problems facing kidney exchange arise from the fact that hospitals have become the main players, and have different strategy sets than individuals, since directors of transplant centers deal with multiple patient-donor pairs. Section I considers how the current algorithms fail to make it safe for hospitals to enroll all their pairs, and how this could be fixed.

Section II considers why long chains play such an important role. Exchange pools are modeled as compatibility graphs whose vertices are incompatible pairs with directed links indicating compatibility between donors and patients. Previous studies focused on the relatively dense compatibility graphs that would arise if blood type incompatibilities were dominant, rather than the sparse graphs corresponding to many highly sensitized patients.

### I. Individual rationality and incentives for hospitals to participate fully

Most kidney exchange clearinghouses try to maximize the (weighted) number of transplants

pairs, despite having many affiliated hospitals.

<sup>3</sup>Failure to enroll compatible pairs in kidney exchange not only deprives those pairs of the possibility of a better matched kidney, it also exacerbates the shortage of blood type O donors who are blood type compatible with all patients.

without attention to whether some incompatible pairs can be internally matched by the hospitals that entered them into the database. Thus, it may not be IR for a hospital to contribute those pairs if it can match internally (see e.g. Roth (2008)).<sup>4</sup> For example, consider a hospital  $A$  with two pairs,  $a_1$  and  $a_2$ , that it can match internally. Suppose it enters those two pairs in a centralized exchange. It may be that the weighted number of transplants is maximized by including  $a_1$  in an exchange but not  $a_2$ , in which case only one of hospital  $A$ 's patients will be transplanted, when it could have performed two transplants on its own.

An allocation (set of disjoint exchanges) is IR if no hospital can internally match more pairs than the number of its pairs matched in the allocation. In Ashlagi and Roth (2011) we show that efficiency and individual rationality cannot always be satisfied simultaneously.<sup>5</sup> However, we also show constructively, in a model based on Erdos-Renyi graphs, that this is not an issue in large exchange pools; under minor assumptions, as the number of hospitals grows (the compatibility graph grows), with probability tending to one there exists an  $\epsilon$ -efficient allocation that is (i) IR and (ii) doesn't use exchanges of size more than 3.<sup>6</sup>

However limit theorems do not address patient populations of clinically relevant size, and so we report simulations that show the limit results are achieved in populations of the size we presently see. These simulations suggest that considerable gains could be achieved by adopting an IR mechanism.

**Simulations.** For each iteration we generate compatibility graphs as follows. According to blood type and sensitivity (PRA) distributions consistent with the UNOS population (see e.g. Ashlagi and Roth (2011)), a patient and 1-3 related donors are drawn uniformly. We then test tissue type compatibility between the patient and her donors using the patient's PRA (which is a probability of incompatibility). A patient and one of her related donors join the pool (as an incompatible pair) if the patient is incompatible

<sup>4</sup>Some weighted matching algorithms put some weight on internal exchanges, but this does not solve the problem.

<sup>5</sup>Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2007b) first showed that no strategyproof mechanism is efficient.

<sup>6</sup>Panos Toulis and David C. Parkes (2012) show a similar result assuming exchanges are limited to size 2.

with all her related donors. In addition, a non-directed donor is generated randomly. To complete the graph, tissue type tests are conducted between donors and patients of different pairs. Finally, we associate each incompatible pair and each non-directed donor to a random hospital.

We compare an algorithm like those currently in use, *max-match*, to an IR mechanism, *IR-match*. Two behaviors by hospitals are considered: (i) truth-telling - the hospital reports all its pairs, and (ii) *withhold internal matches* - the hospital withholds a maximum set of pairs it can internally match.

Each row of Table 1 corresponds to a scenario. The first scenario includes 10 hospitals, and 100 pairs. The ratio between the number of matches a given hospital,  $H$ , obtains from withholding to the number of matches  $H$  obtains from reporting truthfully, given that all other hospitals report truthfully, is given in the third column (under the max-match algorithm) and the sixth column (under the IR-match algorithm). Thus, it is beneficial for  $H$  to withhold its internal matches under max-match, but not under IR-match.<sup>7</sup> The maximum number of matches that can possibly be obtained is given in the fourth column (under max-match when all hospitals report truthfully). The number of matches obtained when all hospitals withhold their internal matches is given in the fifth column. Finally, the number of matches obtained when all hospitals report truthfully under IR-match is given in the last column.

To summarize, (i) a hospital profits from withholding its internal matches under max-match but not under IR-match, (ii) more than 10% more matches will be achieved under truthful-reporting under IR-match than under max-match assuming hospitals withhold internal matches and (iii) the cost of using IR-match is very small even assuming all hospitals report truthfully under max-match, and the gain from using IR-match is substantial if hospitals withhold under max-match (assuming they report truthfully under IR-match).

Individual rationality alone is insufficient to guarantee full participation: hospitals may have incentives to withhold *overdemanded* pairs other than internal matches (for example, an A-O pair is overdemanded since there are fewer such pairs

than O-A pairs due to blood type compatibility). Intuitively, if hospital  $A$  has an overdemanded pair  $a_1$  that it can internally match to pair  $a_2$  or  $a_3$  that are each underdemanded, individual rationality constraints alone may still leave hospital  $A$  better off withholding  $a_1$ , and waiting to see if one of its underdemanded pairs,  $a_2$  or  $a_3$ , is unmatched by the mechanism and then internally matching that pair to  $a_1$ . In Ashlagi and Roth (2011) we introduce an “almost” efficient mechanism which makes truthful reporting an  $\epsilon$ -Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the number of participating hospitals grows large.

## II. The need for long chains

For large dense compatibility graphs, there is almost always an efficient allocation as in Figure 1 (see Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2007a) and Ashlagi and Roth (2011)). Exchanges of size more than 3 are not needed. Furthermore Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2007a) showed via simulations that even on small exchange pools exchanges of size more than 3 do not add many transplants. These simulations show (as does the related theory) that each non-directed donor can increase the number of transplants by at most three. But current exchange programs have many highly sensitized patients, and thus have sparser graphs than graphs generated from the statistics of the general patient population.

Ashlagi, Gamarnik and Roth (2011) provide empirical evidence that longer exchanges and long chains increase efficiency, and provide a theoretical framework based on sparse Erdos-Renyi graphs. Intuitively, if a patient  $p$  is highly sensitized and can receive a kidney from very few donors, the chance that  $p$  will be part of a short exchange is small (and including a small exchange even if one exists might be inefficient). Previous papers explicitly or implicitly ignored tissue-type compatibility implying that graphs are dense. Ashlagi, Gamarnik and Roth (2011) suggest that tissue type compatibility cannot be neglected. They show that for sparse graphs, longer exchanges and longer chains increase the number of transplants linearly as the graph grows. They use simulations to show that their results give a good approximation also in small graphs.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>When all other hospitals withhold their pairs, the gain under max-match for hospital  $H$  increases to more than 10%.

<sup>8</sup>Ashlagi et al. (2011a,b) use simulations to show that long chains increase efficiency in a dynamic setting. John P. Dicker-

hospitals	pairs	max-match			IR match	
		H's gain	truthful reporting #matches	withholding #matches	H's gain	truthful reporting #matches
10	100	1.055	52 (12.9)	43 (8)	0.994	51.6
12	120	1.066	65 (17.2)	54 (11)	0.995	64 (16.6)
15	150	1.061	84 (23.8)	71 (16)	0.988	83.5 (23)
20	200	1.048	117 (36)	101 (26)	0.986	116.6 (34.9)

Table 1: Withholding internal matches vs. reporting truthfully in max-match and IR-match.




Figure 1: The structure of an efficient allocation without altruistic donors. All B-A pairs are matched to A-B (assuming more B-As than A-Bs), the remainder of the A-B pairs are matched in 3-way exchanges using O-A's and B-O's. AB-O are matched in 3-ways each using two overdemanded pairs, and every other overdemanded pair is matched to an underdemanded pair.

Below we report simulations of the effectiveness of long chains. Graphs are generated as in the previous simulations, except we generate more highly sensitized patients by assuming each patient has 3-7 potential related donors; each patient is tested for compatibility with each related donor (this generates a pool with approximately 60% high PRA patients). The advantage of longer exchanges and chains is clear from Table 2 (see also Dickerson et al. (2012) who for similar findings).

Each row in the table corresponds to a different scenario. In the first three scenarios there are 100 pairs (with an average of 62.5 high PRA patients) and the number of non-directed donors is either 2 or 6. The third through seventh columns each describe the number of matches obtained (and in parentheses the number of highly sensitized matches) under different matching algorithms -  $(k, l)$  means we search for the maximum number of transplants allowing exchanges (cycles) up to size  $k$  and chains up to size  $l$ . Thus, with 100 pairs and 2 non-directed donors, an average of 44.48 matches were found when searching for matches using cycles of length at most 3 and chains of length 3.

### III. Conclusion

Kidney exchange programs are maturing, yet progress is still slow. This note describes

son, Ariel D. Procaccia and Sandholm et al. (2012) support these findings with further simulations).

some major issues facing kidney exchange today and suggests solutions that may significantly increase the number of transplants. First, transplant centers withhold their easy to match patient-donor pairs, and we suggest modifying the commonly used matching mechanisms to make it IR for hospitals to participate with all their patients. This applies to compatible as well as incompatible pairs. Blood types cause some pairs to be overdemanded and others to be underdemanded. Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2005a) showed that a significant increase in the number of kidney exchanges could be achieved by allowing compatible pairs to participate (see also Sönmez and Ünver (2011) who analyze graphs with compatible pairs). Second, due to the highly sensitized pools and their sizes, allowing long chains will significantly increase the number of transplants, especially for highly sensitized patients.

As kidney exchange grew the set of players changed. To foster further growth the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses must respond.

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Size	ndds	(2, 3)	(3, 3)	(3, 4)	(3, $\infty$ )	( $\infty$ , $\infty$ )
100 (62.5)	1	27.72 (11.78)	42.58 (22.19)	43.18 (22.52)	46.44 (25.66)	56.78 (35.62)
	2	29.44 (12.71)	44.48 (23.48)	45.64 (24.22)	54.25 (32.17)	58.24 (36.75)
	6	39.08 (18.58)	52.52 (28.82)	55.21 (31.32)	63.1 (38.89)	63.52 (39.98)
150 (94.11)	1	47.49 (21.32)	76.11 (42.86)	76.78 (43.24)	76.72 (43.46)	98.08 (65.07)
	2	49.88 (22.14)	79.26 (44.66)	80.62 (45.76)	90.16 (55.13)	101.34 (67.8)
	6	60.71 (29.02)	87.47 (50.19)	91.04 (53.62)	104.53 (66.81)	105.46 (69.57)

Table 2: Average number of matches and high PRA matches (in parentheses) with different number of non-directed donors (ndds) and different size pools.

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